Can Brazil Lead BRICS to Counter Trump?

The BRICS project was born out of frustration with a world economy long dominated by Western institutions. Since the early 2000s, Brazil, Russia, India, China and later South Africa pushed the argument that global governance should reflect the rise of emerging economies rather than simply preserve the power of the North Atlantic. By 2025, that vision has survived recessions, political swings and diplomatic tensions, and has taken on a fresh urgency as US protectionism returns under Trump. The question now is whether Brazil, the most diplomatically flexible member of the bloc, can turn BRICS into a genuine counterweight to Washington.

When I visited Chatham House, one message came through clearly. According to Professor Matias Spektor, BRICS’ number one priority is strategic autonomy, not in the sense of isolating themselves from the West, but in building enough institutional capability to avoid dependence on any single pole. Brazil’s entire diplomatic tradition is built on that logic. Since the Cold War, the country has diversified its ties so widely that it now trades more with China than the United States, a reversal of the old hemispheric order. Spektor argued that this was deliberate; Brazil has always sought room to manoeuvre, and BRICS today is the framework through which that autonomy is being modernised. In contrast, Brazil’s dependence on Chinese demand risks replacing one vulnerability with another. If the US uses tariffs as political leverage and China leverages market access in return, Brazil could find itself locked between two giants whose priorities are not always aligned with its own. The promise of BRICS, therefore, is not to choose between Washington or Beijing, but to reduce the cost of navigating both.

At the same event, Roberta Braga pointed out the political tension shaping the moment. Donald Trump is reluctant to give President Lula any diplomatic boost, and the United States has imposed 50% tariffs on several Brazilian goods despite running a trade surplus with Brazil. This creates a paradox that feels very similar to the post-war dilemmas of America’s traditional allies; Brazil needs access to US markets yet must now hedge against the volatility of US policy. Braga stressed that Lula understands this, which is why he is reinforcing ties with China and Russia even as he tries to avoid burning bridges with Washington.

It was Oliver Stuenkel who captured the deeper dynamics at play. BRICS, he said, has helped Brazil adapt to the Western world more effectively, not detach from it. Despite the rhetoric, most BRICS members have no interest in severing ties with the West; even Bolsonaro, who spoke obsessively about “communist regimes”, continued trading heavily with China while in office. Stuenkel described a “profound sense of ownership” inside BRICS but also warned that its success has come precisely from not over-reaching. BRICS works when it picks targeted priorities, whether payment systems or development finance, rather than trying to replicate every Western institution in one go.

The BRICS 2025 Final Declaration reflects this pragmatism, revealing an ambitious but disciplined programme: expanding the New Development Bank, improving cross-border payment interoperability, boosting local-currency financing and strengthening the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. These steps move BRICS from symbolism to infrastructure. A functioning BRICS payment system, for example, would reduce reliance on dollar intermediaries and lower transaction costs for members. A BRICS-backed guarantee mechanism could unlock private capital for infrastructure projects. This is the sort of slow, technical work through which global power shifts.

For Brazil, the political opportunity is clear. By leading on the implementation of BRICS’ financial architecture — payment systems, guarantees, and the scaling of the New Development Bank — Lula can position Brazil as the diplomatic centre of gravity within the bloc. That leadership could translate into leverage not only within BRICS, but also in negotiations with the United States and Europe. The risk, as always, is execution. BRICS members are diverse, and their strategic interests do not always align. Without sustained political will, the bloc’s institutional projects may struggle to reach the scale necessary to influence global markets.

Yet the direction of travel is unmistakable. Just as Britain once relied on American nuclear and military power, Brazil increasingly relies on Chinese economic weight. And just as the Special Relationship evolved from defence to technology, BRICS is evolving from rhetoric to infrastructure. This shift could cut transaction costs for Brazilian exporters, reduce exposure to dollar swings and expand credit for infrastructure, but it also increases Brazil’s vulnerability to fluctuations in Chinese demand and the terms attached to Chinese lending. For the global economy, a more structured BRICS financial system could ease stress on emerging markets while accelerating monetary fragmentation. The practical consequence is not a dramatic confrontation with Washington but a change in how Brazil’s economy operates and how much insulation Brazilian households and firms have from the pressures of major-power competition.

The story of BRICS is therefore one of continuity as much as ambition. It began as a call for representation, and now it is becoming a platform for economic insulation. Brazil stands to gain autonomy, diplomatic weight and access to alternative financing. But much of its success will depend on the strength and reliability of institutions still in their formative stages. My judgement is that Brazil can lead BRICS through its most important phase yet, but in doing so, it will also deepen its reliance on China, just as past generations of rising powers deepened their reliance on the dominant systems of their time. BRICS may ultimately reshape global governance. However, if Brazil is to lead that shift, it must reconcile its pursuit of autonomy with the realities of a world where power still tilts heavily towards the largest economies. Strategic autonomy is the goal, but interdependence remains the price.